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CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE'S CHILD NEGLECT/
ABANDONMENT STATUTES: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
OR RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION?
I. INTRODUCTION
Religious freedom-the freedom to believe and practice strange
and, it may be, foreign creeds-has classically been one of the
highest values of our society.'
Religious freedom is a precious commodity in American society.
The United States owes its existence to people who sought to exer-
cise religion without governmental restraint. But just as religious
freedom is an intergral part of America's history and foundation, so
too is governmental interference with religious freedom.2 Society's
interest in maintaining public safety, peace, and order continually
competes with American constitutional religious exercise guarantees.
Although courts have attempted to harmonize these interests, the
tension between them continues to require our judicial system to re-
solve conflicts of grave importance to American society.
Society's increasing concern over the welfare of children has re-
newed the tension between governmental regulation and religious
freedom. In People v. Arnold,3 a mother was convicted of man-
slaughter when she failed to provide medical treatment for her
daughter. The mother was a member of the Church of the First
Born, a religious group which believes in faith healing." She at-
tempted to heal the child spiritually because of her religious beliefs,
and the child subsequently died.5
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1. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 612 (1961) (Brennan, J., concurring and
dissenting).
2. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (denied lax exemp-
tion to religious University because of its discriminatory admissions policy which was a prod-
uct of University officials' religious beliefs); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944)
(upheld statute preventing children from selling in public places even though a Jehovah's Wit-
ness believed that it was her religious duty to do so); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145
(1878) (criminalized the Mormon practice of bigamy).
3. 66 Cal. 2d 438, 426 P.2d 515, 58 Cal. Rptr. 115 (1967).
4. Id. at 442 n.1, 426 P.2d at 517 n.1, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 117 n.1.
5. Id. The child initially experienced stomach pains and vomiting. Over the next two
weeks, the child's condition deteriorated. The mother never called a doctor or provided
medicine. Instead, she called members of the Church of the First Born who came to the home
and prayed for the little girl.
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25
The Arnold case focused attention on California Penal Code
section 270, which makes it a misdemeanor for a parent to willfully
fail to furnish a minor "necessities" including medical or other reme-
dial care.' In the aftermath of Arnold, the California Legislature
recognized a need to protect both a child's welfare and an individ-
ual's religious freedom. The Legislature passed an exemption to Cal-
ifornia Penal Code section 270 which allows parents to provide spir-
itual prayer for children in lieu of statutorily required medical
treatment without sustaining criminal liability. 7
The exemption under section 270 attempts to protect religious
freedom while serving the state's interest in preventing child neglect.
However, despite the section 270 exemption, District Attorneys con-
tinue to prosecute parents under California Penal Code section
273a' when parents choose to treat their children by spiritual
means.9 California Penal Code section 273a makes any person hav-
ing care or custody of a child guilty of a misdemeanor or felony if
that person willfully endangers a child or places a child in a situa-
tion which may endanger the child's health.1" This prosecution leads
6. CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West 1970 & Supp. 1985), provides in relevant part: "If a
parent of a minor child willfully omits, without lawful excuse, to furnish necessary clothing,
food, shelter, or medical attendance, or other remedial care for his or her child, he or she is
guilty of a misdemeanor .... "
7. CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West Supp. 1985) provides:
If a parent provides a minor with treatment by spiritual means through prayer
alone in accordance with the tenets and practices of a recognized church or reli-
gious denomination, by a duly accredited practitioner thereof, such treatment
shall constitute 'other remedial care' as used in this section.
Id.
8. CAL. PENAL CODE § 273a (West 1970 & Supp. 1985) provides in relevant part:
Any person who, under circumstances or conditions likely to produce great bod-
ily harm or death, willfully causes or permits any child to suffer . . . or will-
fully causes or permits such child to be placed in such situation that its person
or health is endangered, is punishable by imprisonment in the county jail not
exceeding one year, or in the state prison for 2, 3, or 4 years.
Any person who, under circumstances or conditions other than those likely
to produce great bodily harm or death, willfully causes or permits any child to
suffer . . . or having the care or custody of any child, willfully causes or per-
mits the person or health of such child to be injured, or willfully causes or
permits such child to be placed in such situation that its person or health may
be endangered, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
Id.
9. People v. Walker, No. 70042, slip op. (Sacramento Cty. Super. Ct. Dec. 18, 1984).
In this case, Ms. Walker's four year-old daughter died of meningitis. Ms. Walker, a Christian
Scientist, had treated her daughter by prayer in accordance with the exemption provided in
CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West 1970 & Supp. 1985). Nevertheless, Ms. Walker was charged
with felony child endangering under CAL. PENAL CODE § 273a (West 1970 & Supp. 1985).
10. CAL. PENAL CODE § 273a (West 1970 & Supp. 1985).
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to confusion as to what legal effect should be given to the section 270
religious exemption. In light of the religious freedoms involved and
the state's interest in protecting the welfare of its citizens, California
courts need to resolve the inherent uncertainty of these two statutes.
This comment will examine the tension between California Pe-
nal Code sections 270 and 273a and will suggest that both religious
freedom and child welfare can be protected by giving full force to the
section 270 exemption. Properly applying the exemption to those
who qualify will remove fears of violating federal and state religious
freedom guarantees. However, in order to protect religious liberties,
the section 270 exemption must withstand federal and state constitu-
tional equal protection guarantees which prohibit the government
from unlawfully discriminating between similarly situated groups.
The exemption might be found to violate equal protection if its ref-
erence to a "recognized church or religious denomination" is con-
strued too narrowly.
The fifth section of this comment will demonstrate that broad,
objective criteria should be used to interpret the phrase "recognized
church or religious denomination," in order to protect the exemption
from constitutional equal protection attack. Additionally, the broad,
objective criteria set forth will assist courts in distinguishing between
spuriously held religious beliefs and sincere claims. This criteria will
not only protect religious liberty, but also will protect child welfare.
The final section of the comment will demonstrate that a broadly
interpreted section 270 exemption can survive both California and
United States constitutional establishment clauses challenges.
This broad interpretation will coincide with the California Leg-
islature's demonstrated desire to protect individual religious freedom
while serving the state's interest in preventing child neglect. Califor-
nia courts can and should enforce the religious exemption under Pe-
nal Code section 270, thereby carrying out legislative intent and en-
suring religious freedom to the greatest extent possible.
II. STATE AND FEDERAL RELIGIOUS GUARANTEES
The first amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits
Congress from establishing religion or from prohibiting the free ex-
ercise thereof."' Despite the sanctity with which courts and Ameri-
can society regard first amendment guarantees, they are not absolute.
The first major free exercise of religion case illustrating such limita-
11. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
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tions, Reynolds v. United States,1" affirmed a federal law criminaliz-
ing bigamy although a Morman claimed polygamy was his religious
duty. The Court held that while the first amendment absolutely pro-
tects religious beliefs, conduct or actions may still be subject to
regulation.'1
Since Reynolds, the United States Supreme Court has consist-
ently held that the free exercise of religion may be subject to limita-
tion if it appears the state has compelling reasons which justify such
limitation."' The Court has found justification for religious regula-
tion when the conduct or actions of those exercising religious free-
dom have posed some substantial threat to public safety, peace, or
order. 5 Religious exercise which may threaten the health or safety
of children constitutes a threat to public safety, and therefore may be
subject to regulation.16 In that instance, the state runs the risk of
illegally regulating religious beliefs.
As long as the rights guaranteed by the California Constitution
provide equal or greater protection than those guaranteed by the fed-
eral Constitution, California courts will interpret and enforce those
rights."7 The California Constitution forbids all laws that involve es-
tablishing a religion. 8
This means that religion shall be freely exercised and enjoyed
"without discrimination or preference." 9 Therefore, the California
Supreme Court may interpret the state right of religious freedom
more broadly than the federal guarantee, because preference is for-
bidden even when there is no discrimination.20
California's treatment of religion is significant because if the
section 270 exemption is viewed as preferring one religion over an-
other, regardless of the purpose of the preference, the exemption will
12. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
13. Id. at 166.
14. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944). This case prohibited children
from selling in public places despite the fact that particular religious beliefs require proselytiz-
ing. The Court stated, "The right to practice religion freely does not include liberty to expose
the community or the child to communicable disease or the latter to ill health or death." 321
U.S. 166-67.
15. See supra note 2.
16. Prince, 321 U.S. at 166.
17. Mandel v. Hodges, 54 Cal. App. 3d 596, 616, 127 Cal. Rptr. 244, 257 (1976). The
California and United States Constitutions contain similar provisions to protect the free exer-
cise of religion.
18. CAL. CONS'r. art. 1, § 4.
19. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 4.
20. Fox v. City of Los Angeles, 22 Cal. 3d 792, 587 P.2d 663, 150 Cal. Rptr. 867
(1978).
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violate the California Constitution. The tension between California
Penal Code section 273a and the section 270 exemption must be ex-
amined and resolved against this constitutional background.
III. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
A. Ambiguity Between Section 270 and Section 273a
It is important to underscore the differences and similarities be-
tween California Penal Code sections 273a and 270. Section 273a
was enacted in 1905 under the penal code chapter concerning child
abandonment and neglect. 2 1 Section 273a creates misdemeanor and
felony penalties for anyone who willfully causes or permits the per-
son or health of a child to be injured or endangered.2" Section 270
was enacted under the same penal code chapter. It creates misde-
meanor penalties for any parent who willfully omits to furnish ne-
cessities for a child, including medical care or other remedial care. 3
Both statutes exist to protect the health and safety of children. In
1976, the California Legislature amended section 270 to clarify the
meaning of "other remedial care."2 4 The amendment states that
treatment by prayer in accordance with the tenets of a recognized
church or religious denomination satisfies the "other remedial care"
requirement. 8
In other words, one who treats a child by spiritual means be-
cause of religious beliefs satisfies the section 270 requirements and is
absolved from liability if the child experiences any injury. Despite a
person's exemption under section 270, the question remains whether
or not the person is still liable for felony or misdemeanor child en-
dangering under section 273a.
When two statutes within a penal code chapter produce differ-
ing results, it must be decided which statute controls.26 The Califor-
nia Legislature enacted the Child Abandonment and Neglect Chap-
ter of the California Penal Code to protect the health and safety of
children.2 7 The judiciary must not ignore any part of this chapter
because doing so would disregard the legislative intent of the stat-
21. See supra note 8.
22. Id.
23. See supra note 6.
24. See supra note 7.
25. Id.
26. See generally In re Williamson, 43 Cal. 2d 651, 653-54, 276 P.2d 593, 594 (1954)
(statutory punishment for conspiracy to violate a specific statute conflicted with punishment
under the general conspiracy provision of that statute).
27. See supra text accompanying notes 20-21.
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utes. The solution to the conflict lies in determining the purpose be-
hind the legislative enactments, and in deciding how each statute
should be applied in light of the other.
B. When Statutory Application is Uncertain, the Statute Contain-
ing Specific Provisions Should Control
In construing a statute, courts should ascertain the intent of the
Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law and should
not change the clear words of a statute to accomplish a purpose
that does not appear on the face of the statute or from its legis-
lative history. Words must be construed in context and statutes
must be harmonized both internally and with each other to the
extent possible.28
California courts consistently hold that statutes should be har-
monized and that clauses should be read with direct reference to
those which relate to the same subject.29 Those provisions which re-
late to the same subject or have the same general purpose should be
interpreted to constitute one law.30 When a specific provision and a
general provision relate to the same subject, the specific provision
will govern.3 This is true even though the general provision, stand-
ing alone, is broad enough to encompass the subject to which the
more specific provision applies. 2 This analysis was utilized by the
court in People v. Swann." In this case, involving the fraudulent use
of credit cards, the court applied misdemeanor provisions governing
credit cards instead of felony forgery provisions. The court found
that the state could not prosecute under the more general felony stat-
ute if the conduct coincided with that prohibited by a more specific
statute. 4 Penal Code section 273a is a general child abuse statute
28. People v. Mobil Oil, 143 Cal. App. 261, 270, 192 Cal. Rptr. 155, 160 (1983) (quot-
ing California M'frs. Ass'n v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 24 Cal. 3d 836, 844, 598 P.2d 836,
840, 157 Cal. Rptr. 676, 680 (1979)).
29. Herbert Hawkins Realtors Inc. v. Milheiser, 140 Cal. App. 3d 334, 338, 189 Cal.
Rptr. 450, 452 (1983). See also Jefferson Classroom Teachers Ass'n v. Jefferson Elementary
School Dist., 137 Cal. App. 3d 993, 999, 187 Cal. Rptr. 542, 547 (1982); Grogan-Beall v.
Ferdinand Roten Galleries, 133 Cal. App. 3d 969, 978, 184 Cal. Rptr. 411, 417 (1982).
30. Old Homestead Bakery, Inc., v. Marsh, 75 Cal. App. 247, 258 (1925), quoted in
Isobe v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 12 Cal. 3d 584, 590-91, 526 P.2d 528,
532, 116 Cal. Rptr. 376, 380 (1974).
31. Sanders v. Yuba County, 247 Cal. App. 2d 748, 753-54, 55 Cal. Rptr. 852, 856
(1967).
32. Id.
33. People v. Swann, 213 Cal. App. 2d 447, 449-50, 28 Cal. Rptr. 830 (1963).
34. Id. at 449, 28 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
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mandating felony or misdemeanor penalties. It is a general statute
because it prohibits any conduct thought to endanger children.
Therefore, Penal Code section 270, the more specific statute, should
govern in cases when the two conflict. 35
Furthermore, the California Supreme Court has held that a
statutory exemption which provides a defense for one crime may ap-
ply to another crime if the defense is consistent with legislative in-
tent. This applies whether or not the defense is expressly set out in
the statute defining the second crime. 6
Cases discussing statutory interpretation seek to discover the
legislative intent behind a statute in order to properly interpret a
statute in accordance with that intent. Consequently, the California
Legislature's intent in passing section 273a and the section 270 ex-
emption must be examined in order to resolve the tension between
these statutes.
C. When Statutory Application is Uncertain, Deference Should be
Given to Legislative Intent
1. Legislative Intent in Enacting Section 270
In 1925, the California Legislature enacted the Section 270 ex-
emption to protect religious freedom. The legislative history of the
statute demonstrates that "the other remedial care" exemption was
added in direct response to manslaughter prosecutions initiated by
the Los Angeles District Attorney in 1920. 3 7 In reaction to People v.
Arnold, the 1976 amendment to the exemption specifically autho-
rizes that spiritual treatment satisfies the "other remedial care" re-
quirements." Remarks submitted to the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary for consideration of the section 270 amendment indicated
that the Arnold case might undermine the legislative desire to pro-
tect child welfare and religious freedom.39 The Assembly Committee
35. See supra text accompanying notes 31-33.
36. People v. Jenkins, 28 Cal. 3d 494, 503-09, 620 P.2d 587, 592-96, 170 Cal. Rptr. 1,
6-10 (1980) (allowed prosecutions for AFDC fraud to proceed either under the Welfare and
Institutions Code or under the general perjury statute in the Penal Code).
37. Brief for Defendant, People v. Walker, No. 70042, slip op. (Sacramento Cty. Super.
Ct. Dec. 18, 1984).
38. People v. Arnold, 66 Cal. 2d 438, 426 P.2d 515, 58 Cal. Rptr. 115 (1967). See
supra text accompanying notes 2-6.
39. The proponents of the exemption amendment stated that the purpose of the bill is to
clarify what has been a long standing policy of the State. This policy is not to treat parents
who are legitimately practicing their religious beliefs, and who thereby do not provide specified
medical treatment for their child, as violating the law. The proponents of the exemption
amendment feared the Arnold case might undermine this longstanding policy. CAL. SENATE
1985]
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on Criminal Justice expressed similar concerns.40 The main objec-
tion was that "if treatment by prayer was to be recognized in part,
the parents should not be liable for the results of using a permitted
mode of healing." 41
This legislative background provides proof that the Legislature
wanted to ensure that parents would not be prosecuted for practicing
their religion and for treating their children by spiritual means in
accordance with section 270. The United States Supreme Court
holds that while penal statutes should be strictly construed, they are
not to be so strictly construed that they defeat obvious legislative in-
tent."2 It is difficult, therefore, to see how one could properly be
prosecuted under section 273a if he or she falls within the 270 ex-
emption. Furthermore, the California Supreme Court holds that
when penal statutes are at issue, any ambiguity or inconsistency be-
tween provisions calls for the construction which is most favorable to
the defendant."'
2. Legislative Intent in Enacting Section 273a
The debates surrounding the enactment of Section 273a were
not recorded, but the underlying purpose of the statute can be
gleaned from the language of the statute. The Legislature acted to
ensure that those with custody or care of children would not will-
fully cause or permit a child to be placed in a situation which would
endanger his or her health. Children have always been provided spe-
cial legal protection."" Similarly, section 270 was originally enacted
to prevent child neglect, and only later was it amended to include its
current exemption. The Legislature wanted to make sure that chil-
dren who are dependent upon others for "necessities" actually re-
ceive those necessities. The legislative intent underlying both Penal
Code statutes is to protect the welfare of children. Subsequently, the
Legislature recognized the need to protect religious liberty as well.
Therefore, section 270 was amended to include its current exemp-
tion. Given the singular purpose behind each statute, it seems un-
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, BILL DIGEST, COMMENTS ON AB 3843 (1976).
40. CAL. ASSEMBLY COMM. ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, BILL DIGEST, COMMENTS ON AB
3843 (1976).
41. Id.
42. Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 831 (1974).
43. People v. Superior Ct., 24 Cal. 3d 428, 435, 595 P.2d 139, 142, 155 Cal. Rptr. 704,
708 (1979).
44. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 11475, 11476, 11476.1, 11478, 11478.5
(West 1980 & Supp. 1985) (mandated child support).
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likely that the Legislature wanted to protect religious freedom under
one statute but not under the other.
IV. SECTION 273A SHOULD BE READ TO INCLUDE THE SECTION
270 EXEMPTION
The legislative goals of the statutes coupled with the California
case law requirement that statutes be construed in accordance with
legislative intent, leads to the conclusion that the exemption should
be given full effect. This comment suggests that the courts should
therefore interpret section 270 in conjunction with section 273a. The
section 270 exemption would thereby absolve individuals from liabil-
ity under both statutes. Such analysis fulfills legislative intent4 and
judicial demand for harmonious and consistent interpretations of
statutes.
46
Giving section 270, the more specific statute, full effect also
complies with the California Supreme Court's view that penal stat-
ute interpretation should be applied most favorably to the defendant
Legislative intent is then served because each statute is given effect. 47
This statutory interpretation alone resolves the dilemma be-
tween the Penal Code section 270 exemption and section 273a, yet
the gravity of the interests involved necessitates a discussion of the
constitutional implications. Should a court fail to apply the section
270 exemption to those falling within its provisions and instead al-
low prosecution under section 273a, federal and state religious liber-
ties will be violated.
A. Religious Freedom and the BelieflConduct Distinction
The first amendment embodies two freedoms, the freedom to
believe and the freedom to act. While the first freedom must not be
abridged, the state may abridge the freedom to act.48 The difficulty
45. See supra text accompanying notes 37-42.
46. See supra text accompanying notes 28-30.
47. People v. Superior Ct., 24 Cal. 3d 428, 436, 595 P.2d 139, 142, 155 Cal. Rptr. 704,
708 (1979).
48. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940) (Jehovah's Witnesses were
arrested and charged with breaching the peace for playing an anti-Catholic phonograph record
in a predominantly Catholic neighborhood. The Court reversed the conviction because the
statute was not narrowly defined and did not proscribe conduct which was a clear and present
danger to a substantial state interest).
Freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to such worship as the individual
may choose cannot be restricted by law. On the other hand, it safeguards the
free exercise of the chosen form of religion. Thus the Amendment embraces two
concepts-freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the
19851
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lies in establishing where belief ends and conduct begins, for the
state can argue that prosecuting parents or guardians for treating
their children spiritually merely regulates religious conduct, not reli-
gious beliefs. But as the Supreme Court noted in Wisconsin v.
Yoder,"' these cases are not made easier simply by convicting the
defendants for their religious conduct and not for their religious be-
liefs. "[fIn this context belief and action cannot be neatly confined in
logic-tight compartments."50
Religious belief and religious conduct often are inseparable.
Prohibiting or regulating conduct which is the manifestation of a be-
lief may suppress that belief. The state then burdens or punishes
action which is a mere extension of a religious belief. Criminal law
has long recognized that one cannot be prosecuted for mere thoughts,
but that thoughts acted upon may be punishable.51 Yet, when the
facts of a case involve religious beliefs which are acted upon, com-
parisons to other aspects of the law become virtually impossible be-
cause of the high regard the law places on religious liberties. The
law places such high regard on religious liberties because this coun-
try owes its existence to people who came here to escape religious
persecution and religious authoritarianism. Consequently, courts
have refused to treat the belief/conduct distinction lightly. 2
While prosecution under 273a may only be an attempt to con-
trol religious conduct, such prosecution will result in controlling reli-
gious beliefs. Sherbert v. Verner" illustrates this dilemma. Sherbert
involved a denial of unemployment benefits to a woman whose reli-
gious beliefs precluded her from working on Saturdays. The state
found her ineligible to receive benefits because under the statute's
terms she had failed without good cause to accept suitable work
when it was offered."4 The Court refuted state arguments that no
denial of constitutional liberties had occurred because its action did
not "in any way prevent [the claimant] in the exercise of her right
and freedom to observe her religious beliefs in accordance with the
dictates of her conscience."" The Court instead found that the gov-
ernment was forcing the employee to choose between practicing her
nature of things, the second cannot be.
Id. at 303.
49. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
50. Id. at 220.
51. S. KADISH, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 257-59 (4th ed. 1983).
52. See infra text accompanying notes 53-56.
53. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
54. Id. at 399-401.
55. Id. at 401.
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religion and receiving benefits by accepting work. The Court real-
ized that this coercive measure punished the free exercise of constitu-
tional liberties.56
The Court held that by proscribing the claimant's conduct, the
state was proscribing the claimant's religious beliefs. Similarly, pros-
ecuting a parent or guardian for treating a child by spiritual means
in accordance with religious beliefs violates that individual's constitu-
tional liberties.57 The threatened prosecution is the state's attempt to
proscribe the individual's ability to adhere to a primary tenet of his
or her religious belief.
Considering the subtleties of the belief/conduct distinction, the
state violates an individual's right to free exercise by prosecuting the
individual under California Penal Code section 273a. California's
prosecution of these cases may punish actions which are manifesta-
tions of a sincere religious belief. This threat becomes more serious
considering that the Penal Code section 270 exemption exists to pro-
tect religious beliefs. If courts allow religious belief protections to
erode, the religious freedom of many California citizens could be
destroyed.
B. Violations of Religious Freedom are Justified Only by a Com-
pelling State Interest
If California is found to have violated constitutional religious
freedom guarantees, the state then has the opportunity to justify the
violation. Such a violation is constitutional only when a compelling
state interest exists which overrides religious freedom protections. 8
A child's health and safety is a compelling state interest,59 particu-
larly when a life or death situation is presented. The United States
Supreme Court also requires the state to show it is using the least
restrictive alternative available when it burdens an individual's reli-
gious exercise." Because California courts will be determining
whether or not religious liberties are violated by prosecuting people
56. Id. at 404-06.
57. Laurie Walker, the defendant in the pending Walker case, is a Christian Scientist.
California is prosecuting Walker for using spiritual means to heal her child, which, if the state
prevails, would proscribe her from adhering to this primary tenent of her religion. See, e.g.,
M.B. EDDY, SCIENCE AND HEALTH WITH KEY TO THE SCRIPTURES (Boston: Trustees Under
the Will of Mary Baker G. Eddy, 1984) (central to the Christian Science religion is the belief
that permanent healing can only occur through spiritual means and that Christian Scientists
should continually strive to demonstrate this healing method).
58. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
59. See supra note 14.
60. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404.
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under section 273a, it is essential to examine the federal and Califor-
nia requirements which would justify such a violation.
California and federal courts apply the same test to determine
the validity of a law which inhibits religious exercise. The leading
California case on the issue is People v. Woody.61 Woody involved a
group of Navajo Indians who were convicted for unauthorized pos-
session of peyote. The California Supreme Court reversed the con-
victions under a Sherbert analysis"' because it found the prohibition
of peyote possession inhibited the defendants' religious practice.6"
Like the Sherbert Court, the California court reached this conclusion
making no distinction between religious belief and religious conduct.
The Woody court simply found that prohibiting peyote use struck at
the theological core of the group's religion."
Upon establishing the religious liberty infringement, the Woody
court considered whether the state could justify the infringement.
The court found no justifiable compelling state interest in the prohi-
bition and little merit in the argument that California could no
longer effectively enforce narcotic laws if courts create exceptions to
the laws. Additionally, the California court applied the Sherbert
guidelines and held that even if the evidence supported the threat
that narcotics laws could not be enforced, the state would still have
to show that no other form of regulation could accomplish that state
objective without burdening first amendment rights.65
Following the United States Supreme Court guidelines, the
Woody court first established that religious liberty was inhibited.
The court then looked to see if a compelling state interest justified
the inhibition, and if so, whether the burden on religion was the
least restrictive burden given the state's interest.
Applying this analysis to the Penal Code problem, California
must show that prosecuting an individual for spiritual treatment of a
child under section 273a serves California's compelling interest and
is the least restrictive alternative to protect that interest. California
will have great difficulty meeting this test unless it applies the sec-
tion 270 exemption.
California will have no difficulty in showing that protecting a
child's health and safety is a compelling interest and that Penal Code
section 273a serves this interest. This is because Reynolds v. United
61. 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1969).
62. Id. at 718, 394 P.2d at 815, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 72.
63. People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d at 722, 394 P.2d at 818, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 74.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 723, 394 P. 2d at 819, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
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States" demonstrates that a child's health and safety is a compelling
state interest, and because section 273a punishes those who willfully
endanger a child's health and safety. Yet California will fail to show
that it is applying the least restrictive burden on religion if it ignores
the section 270 exemption.
The less restrictive alternative available to California is the en-
forcement of the section 270 exemption. The exemption exists specif-
ically to lessen the burden on religious practice. Ignoring the section
270 exemption violates the federal and state constitutional religious
freedoms of those who fall within its provisions. Because enforcing
the exemption is crucial to safeguarding religious guarantees, the ex-
emption must be able to withstand state and federal constitutional
equal protection and establishment clause requirements.
V. EQUAL PROTECTION CONCERNS WITH SECTION 270
EXEMPTION LANGUAGE-No DISCRIMINATION AMONG
RELIGIOUS BELIEFS
The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution
guarantees that "[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which
shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of the laws."6 People who are similarly situated must be
treated similarly. 8 The section 270 exemption language which refers
to a "recognized church or religious denomination" may therefore
pose a threat to these equal protection guarantees. If narrowly inter-
preted, its language may serve to protect only the religious liberties
of better known or established religions, and would thereby not treat
similarly situated people similarly. Moreover, when such disparate
treatment affects a fundamental right, the law will only be upheld
under a strict scrutiny analysis.69
A state must show an overriding reason for a classification
when the classification affects a fundamental right because such
rights are guaranteed by the Constitution and deserve the highest
degree of judicial protection.70 As a result, when a strict scrutiny
66. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
67. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 7a.
68. Tiger v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147 (1940) (agriculture and other economic pursuits
are not similarly situated for equal protection purposes); In re Eric J., 25 Cal. 3d 522, 530,
601 P.2d 549, 533, 159 Cal. Rptr. 317, 320-21 (1979) (minors and adults are not similarly
situated as to their liberty interests for equal protection purposes).
69. Dun v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1971) (applied strict scrutiny analysis to strike
down durational residence requirement for voting); accord, Westbrook v. Mihaly, 2 Cal. 3d
765, 784-85, 471 P.2d 487, 500-01, 87 Cal. Rptr. 839, 852-53 (1970).
70. Id. at 336 (right to participate in the electoral process was deemed fundamental and
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analysis is applied to a classification, a state's action is not entitled to
the usual presumption of validity. A state carries the burden of justi-
fying a classification which affects a fundamental right.7 1 Under a
strict scrutiny test, if a court finds that the classification does indeed
serve a compelling interest, a state still must show that the distinc-
tions drawn in the law are necessary to further this interest.72
This equal protection analysis applies to the instant discussion
because equal protection guarantees fully apply to penal statutes.73
When a penal statute diminishes an individual's religious liberty, it
touches a constitutionally protected right.7 Because classifications
based upon a "recognized church or religious denomination '7 5 may
mean the difference between loss of liberty or exemption from pen-
alty, these classifications must withstand strict scrutiny. Conse-
quently, California must show that the section 270 exemption lan-
guage, which can be read to protect the religious liberties of some,
serves a compelling state interest and that this language is necessary
to further that purpose.
A. Meeting the Compelling State Interest Requirement
California must show that the section 270 exemption language
serves a compelling state interest in order for the exemption to with-
stand an equal protection analysis. Section 270 was enacted to pro-
tect the health, safety, and welfare of children. 76 Therefore the stat-
ute meets the first part of the equal protection requirement by
serving the compelling state interest of protecting children.7 7 The ex-
emption language itself, however, must also serve the state's compel-
ling purpose. Exempting only state "recognized" religious creeds
helps serve that purpose while making only a narrow allowance for
free religious exercise. Presumably the Legislature confined its lan-
guage to a "recognized church or religious denomination" to prevent
child neglect which arises from arguably spurious religious belief
claims. Therefore, such a classification does serve the compelling
the state could not show a compelling reason for a classification affecting this right).
71. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969) (state's interest in preserving the
fiscal integrity of its programs not substantial enough to warrant denying welfare benefits to
persons residing in the state for less than a year).
72. Cotton v. Municipal Ct., 59 Cal. App. 3d 601, 606, 130 Cal. Rptr. 876, 879 (1976).
73. Id.
74. Id. (A penal statute touches the personal liberty of the individual convicted of violat-
ing the statute).
75. CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West 1970 & Supp. 1985).
76. See supra text accompanying notes 21-23.
77. See supra text accompanying notes 14-16.
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state interest of protecting children. Still, the state must show that
the distinctions drawn in the exemption language are necessary to
further this compelling interest.
B. Narrow Interpretation of the Section 270 Exemption is not
Necessary to Further the State's Compelling Interest
It is difficult to see how an arbitrary distinction between more
established religions and those not as popularly recognized necessa-
rily furthers the state's interest in protecting children. The Califor-
nia courts have yet to determine which religious beliefs this exemp-
tion language includes and excludes. Nevertheless, the exemption
may violate equal protection provisions if it is read too narrowly.
Although the state should not permit counterfeit religious belief
claims raised in defense to child abuse or neglect, the state cannot
show that exempting one religious group over another is necessary to
protect children. More importantly, in limiting what is deemed a
"recognized church or religious denomination," the state blatantly
condones some religions to the detriment of others. Not only does
this violate equal protection guarantees, but such arbitrary govern-
ment favoritism comes dangerously close to governmental establish-
ment of religion in violation of constitutional guarantees.
C. Equal Protection Concerns are Met by Applying the Seeger
Sincerity of Belief Test When Determining Whether a Religion
Qualifies Under the Section 270 Exemption
The exemption distinctions must serve the state's interest in
protecting children. If California tries to justify arbitrarily favoring
one religion over another, it sanctions some religions but not others.
In California's attempt to protect the health and safety of children, it
cannot measure the validity of a religious belief to show why some
religions should be exempt under section 270 and why others should
not. But careful judicial interpretation of the exemption language
can save the exemption from invalidation under equal protection re-
quirements. Broad interpretation will serve to both save the exemp-
tion and thereby to protect both religious liberties and the health,
safety, and welfare of children. Serving both interests is possible if
courts interpret the section 270 exemption language by standards set
forth by the United States Supreme Court in United States v.
Seeger. 8
78. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
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Seeger involved claims of conscientious objectors to military
duty. The federal law involved exempted those who oppose partici-
pation in war in any form by virtue of their religious training and
belief. 9 The Court acknowledged that the exemption embodied con-
gressional recognition that one could qualify for the exemption with-
out belonging to an organized church. 80 The majority undertook a
lengthy discussion of the broad spectrum of religious beliefs in this
country. The discussion illustrated the difficulties courts face when
determining whether a belief qualifies as religious and therefore en-
titles one to exemption. The Court derived a test to determine "reli-
gious belief." The Court established the standard that the claimed
belief must be manifested in the life of the objector to the same de-
gree that an orthodox belief is evidenced in the life of one who would
definitely fall within the exemption. 1
The Seeger test is the Court's attempt to determine the sincerity
of a religious belief.82 Under tort law, a judge or jury decides
whether an individual behaved as a reasonable person would have in
order to determine if that person was negligent. Similarly, the Seeger
test sets up a reasonable religious person standard by which courts
can decide whether or not a defendant falls within the section 270
exemption language. Given the previously stated proscriptions
against state sanctioned religions,8 the Seeger test would limit the
state to determining the sincerity of the religious belief, not the mer-
its of the belief. Recognizing the personal nature of religion, this test
appears to be the best way to protect not only child welfare, but also
religious liberty.
Applying the Seeger test to those claiming exemption under sec-
tion 270 allows a broad enough interpretation to avoid what might
otherwise be an unconstitutional preference for religion. Because the
state should not allow spurious religious belief claims as defenses
against child neglect prosecutions, applying a Seeger interpretation
would provide objective criteria for interpretation, while not uncon-
stitutionally confining or dangerously expanding the exemption.
Courts should be allowed discretion to test religious belief
79. UNIVERSAL MILITARY TRAINING AND SERVICE ACT § 6(0), 50 U.S.C. § 4560)
(1982).
80. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 172.
81. Id. at 184.
82. See also Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda, 153 Cal. App. 2d 673,
692, 315 P.2d 394, 411 (1957) (applied a Seeger test to determine eligibility under a religious
tax exemption).
83. See supra text accompanying notes 18-20.
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claims within fairly objective "reasonable religious person" guide-
lines. The California Supreme Court acknowledges the ability of a
judge and jury to distinguish between those who feign belief in a
religion and those who sincerely adhere to a religion." As the Seeger
Court emphasized, a claim that a belief is central to a. person's faith
will be highly scrutinized under a factual determination, but the va-
lidity of the belief itself cannot be questioned.8
The Seeger test resolves constitutional equal protection
problems. The state will not prosecute people after evaluating the
value of their religious belief, but will limit its examination to the
sincerity of the belief as determined by applying a reasonable reli-
gious person standard. As a result, the state will be able to guard
against any counterfeit religious belief claims raised in defense to
charges of child neglect and abuse. Not only will the Seeger test
thereby meet California's interests of protecting a child's health and
safety, but it will also protect sincere religious belief.
Although applying a Seeger test to the section 270 exemption
language will satisfy possible equal protection concerns, the problem
remains whether a Seeger analysis will meet constitutional establish-
ment clause concerns.
VI. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE CONCERNS WITH SECTION 270
EXEMPTION LANGUAGE-No PREFERENCE FOR ANY
RELIGIOUS BELIEF
A. Preference/Discrimination Distinction
In erecting a wall of separation between church and state, the
framers of our Constitution acted upon the belief that a union
of government and religion tends to destroy government and to
degrade religion. When government . . . alli[es] itself with one
particular form of religion, the inevitable result . . . [is] that it
incurs the hatred, disrespect, and even contempt of those who
h[olld contrary beliefs."
A broad interpretation of the section 270 exemption language
will not only alleviate equal protection concerns, but also it will
guard against one of the founding fathers' primary fears-the gov-
84. People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 726, 394 P.2d 813, 821, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 77
(1969).
85. Mullaney v. Woods, 97 Cal. App. 3d 710, 724 n.16, 158 Cal. Rptr. 902, 908 n.16
(1979).
86. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962).
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ernmental establishment of religion.
The United States Supreme Court in Everson v. Board of Edu-
cation87 discussed governmental actions which violate the United
States Constitution's establishment clause.88 The establishment
clause affords protection against state sponsorship, financial support,
and active involvement in religious liberty.89 Government is deemed
actively involved in religious liberty whenever it prefers one religion
over another.90 Consequently, any state preference for a religion will
be invalidated unless it is justified by a compelling governmental in-
terest.91 The law or action in question must also be closely fitted to
further that interest.92 In addition, the California Constitution guar-
antees the free exercise and enjoyment of religion without discrimi-
nation or preference.98 Even if the purpose of a law or state action is
secular, and therefore is not discriminatory on its face, if state action
results in a preference for a religion, the action cannot stand.94
Therefore, California confers a very broad religious freedom guaran-
tee. While the United States Constitution prohibits discrimination
among religions, California's establishment clause prohibits even de
facto discrimination. Regardless of lack of discriminatory intent, a
California state action will be invalidated if it results in preferential
treatment of a religion."
This preference/discrimination distinction is well illustrated in
Fox v. City of Los Angeles."' There the California Supreme Court
found that the illumination of a cross on the Los Angeles City Hall
at Christmas and Easter constituted an unconstitutional religious
preference. The court found a preference had occurred even though
the city's stated purpose was to promote "peace and good fellowship
toward all mankind. '97 Discrimination goes to the purpose of the
law. But, in California, regardless of the secular purpose of the law,
if a preference among religions results, the law violates the Califor-
87. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
88. Id. at 15-16.
89. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 359 (1975) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397
U.S. 664, 668 (1970)).
90. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982) (invalidated law which required registration
and reporting for only those religious organizations receiving less than half their total contribu-
tions from members).
91. Id. at 15-16.
92. Id.
93. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 4.
94. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
95. Id.
96. 22 Cal. 3d 792, 796, 587 P.2d 663, 665, 150 Cal. Rptr. 867, 869 (1978).
97. Id. at 804, 587 P.2d at 670, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 870.
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nia Constitution and cannot stand.9'
B. Establishment Clause Concerns are met by Applying the Seeger
Sincerity of Belief Test when Determining Whether a Religion Qual-
ifies under the Section 270 Exemption
A narrow reading of the section 270 exemption language to in-
clude only state-recognized religions would violate the California
Constitution by exempting only those members of more established
religions from prosecution under section 273a. Such a narrow read-
ing would clearly constitute a state preference for religion in viola-
tion of the California Constitution." Yet invalidating the exemption
altogether would result in the unlawful prohibition of religious exer-
cise.1 00 However, these establishment clause/religious preference
concerns can be resolved by using the Seeger guidelines to interpret
the section 270 exemption. 0
If the reasonable religious person standard enunciated in Seeger
is used to determine the sincerity of a claimed religious belief, equal
protection and establishment clause concerns are unwarranted. The
courts will then limit their examination to the sincerity of an individ-
ual's religious belief and the nature or popularity of the belief will
not enter the analysis. As a result, the state will not be discriminat-
ing among religions or preferring any religion over another. Accord-
ingly, the exemption will be able to withstand constitutional attack.
The state will maintain control in preserving the health and. safety of
children while also protecting constitutionally guaranteed religious
liberties.
VII. CONCLUSION
The United States and California constitutional religious guar-
antees, though sancrosanct, are not absolute. While the first amend-
ment absolutely protects religious beliefs, conduct may be regulated
when justified by a compelling state interest. Religious conduct often
is but an extension of religious belief, therefore whenever possible
the state must draw its regulation narrowly to avoid burdening reli-
gious exercise guarantees.
The California Legislature has manifested a compelling interest
98. Id. at 796, 587 P.2d at 665, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 869.
99. See supra text accompanying notes 18-20.
100. See supra text accompanying notes 60-64.
101. See supra text accompanying notes 78-85.
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in preserving the health and safety of children. The legislature has
also stated its sensitivity to state/religion questions and to the neces-
sity of protecting constitutional religious guarantees to the greatest
extent possible. Consequently, when enacting penalties for those who
fail to adequately provide for children, the Legislature exempted
from prosecution those who, for religious purposes, use spiritual in-
stead of medical means to treat children. This exemption poses mini-
mal burdens on religious exercise in accordance with constitutional
religious guarantee requirements. Statutory manifestations of legisla-
tive intent which are amplified by constitutional religious guarantees
cannot be disregarded. The section 270 exemption must be enforced
regardless of other laws which may appear contrary to the
exemption.
If the exemption is applied too narrowly, it will result in gov-
ernment preference for religion and thereby threaten equal protec-
tion and establishment clause mandates. Broad interpretation of the
exemption language prevents that occurrence. The courts can apply
a Seeger reasonable religious person standard to those claiming the
section 270 exemption and thereby avoid the danger that counterfeit
religious belief claims will be raised to defend child abuse or neglect
charges.
The tension between the California Penal Code section 270 ex-
emption and section 273a is complex and serious. The welfare of
children as well as one of the most precious individual liberties guar-
anteed by both the California and United States Constitutions are at
stake. This comment has shown it is possible to preserve both
interests.
The California Legislature has demonstrated its desire to pro-
tect individual religious freedom while serving the state's interest in
preventing child neglect and abuse. As a result, courts should not
hesitate to apply the religious exemption under Penal Code section
270. Such application will protect both children and religious
freedom.
Jenny Brown
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